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secularized persons are not consistently rational themselves if they dismiss
theism as irrational only because it does not match the presuppositions of
their own system.
The rational effectiveness of such an apology, however, does not
appear so impressive when one realizes that the "rationality" of a system
does not necessarily entail its "truth." Nash is aware of this fact when he
correctly explains that "people have in the past behaved quite rationally
with regard to beliefs that we know to be false" (p. 75). Additionally,
naturalism is not shown to be either "irrational" or "false." Consequently,
the issue regarding a rational basis for choosing between theism and
naturalism as systems seems to reach a stalemate.
One wonders whether rational apologetics should argue for more than
the rationality of theism as a system. An effective apologetics should
include the "truth" dimension of the system. Nash fails at that point, yet
his "comparison of ideological systems" approach to apologetics could
prove to be fruitful if the issue of "truth" is integrated into that system.
That would require Nash to develop his thinking from "faith and reason"
to "faith and truth." According to this strategy, the opposite views to be
considered must first be analyzed on the basis of their systematic presuppositions; second, be developed in their actual theoretical interpretation of
reality as a whole; and, third, be compared regarding their "truth" on the
basis of the verification of their theoretical claims on the meaning of
reality with reality itself. Nash sets the stage for such a strategy in the first
part of Faith clr Reason, but fails to carry it to its ultimate consequence as it
relates to the "truth" dimension of the controversy between systems. Such
an approach would require not only a critical analysis of theism's presuppositions and components (including ontological, metaphysical, and
epistemological structures), but also should include as "the opponent"
more than just naturalism. Several different ideological systems that currently challenge not the rationality but the truthfulness of Christian theism
should be considered. If followed, this approach could prove to be beneficial not only for apologetic purposes, but for a much needed self-criticism
of theism as well.
Despite its deficiencies, Nash's book is helpful. Anyone interested in a
clear introduction to the current state of rational apologetics in the Reformed tradition will benefit from Nash's Faith 6.Reason.
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Clark H. Pinnock was a Calvinistic evangelical until about 1970.
Since then he has been on a pilgrimage from "Augustine to ArminiusW-
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an experience shared in chapter one of The Grace of God. The following
chapters (2-15) constitute a symposium of essays on determinism versus
free will by such scholars as Fritz Guy, I. Howard Marshall, Terry L.
Miethe, Jack W. Cottrell, Richard Rice, William L. Craig, John E.
Sanders, C. Stephen Evans, Randall G. Basinger, William G. Macdonald,
William J. Abraham, Grant R. Osborne, Jerry L. Walls, and Bruce
Reichenbach.
While the book's title includes the phrase "A Case for Arminianism,"
the authors, generally, do not subscribe to a thoroughgoing, classical
Arminianism. Craig suggests a Calvinist-Arminian rapprochement, Abraham encourages Calvinists and Arminians to borrow lavishly from each
other, and Osborne prefers a modified Arminian theology that balances
sovereignty and responsibility. However, each author begins his chapter by
refuting the Calvinist/determinist position on a given issue before contending for one that is free will.
Central to the issue of determinism is the question of God's sovereignty. How can God be sovereign unless His will, His knowledge, His
justice, His love, and His grace be absolute? But piling absolute upon
absolute results in serious paradox if not outright contradiction. Hence,
Cottrell and Basinger call for a modified, biblical understanding of God's
sovereign will because deterministic/absolute sovereign will leads to fatalism. Reichenbach, moreover, argues for true human freedom and moral
responsibility (humans are more than mere animals) by denying the
necessitarian view of divine sovereignty and asserting that man has genuine
freedom to accept or reject God's offer of grace.
Critical, also, to the issue of determinism is the question of God's
character. Can God, through His foreknowledge, elect some of His creatures to be damned and still be loving and just?
One way to deal with the divine attributes is to make one of them
absolute and condition the others accordingly. This seems to be what
happens when Guy considers the love of God. A loving God, as defined in
the life and teachings of Jesus, would not will any of His creatures to be
damned. But a loving God, by the same token, would not force any to be
saved if they choose otherwise. Universalism may be attractive, but it is not
biblical.
In discussing God's grace, Marshall and Miethe argue for a universal
or unlimited atonement because the alternative is election in the sense that
God elects some to be deprived of His grace-a position contrary to the
clear witness of scripture, in which God makes appeals for all mankind to
repent and be saved. Walls seeks to show how Wesley's conditional view of
predestination and a modified divine-command theory avoid the charge
that God is immoral and unjust.
But if the character of God is the Achilles heel for Calvinistic determinism, God's foreknowledge is the Achilles heel for Arminianism.
The
Arminius himself did not know quite how to deal with the dilemma.
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prophetic element in scripture requires divine foreknowledge, yet absolute
foreknowledge does deny human freedom.
Craig finds the solution in Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge,
which is enjoying a current resurgence, but which must be somewhat
suspect because of, among other considerations, the convoluted logic it
requires. Rice rejects Molina's thesis ("if God's creatures have genuine
freedom, which possible world is actualized depends on their decisions as
well as on God's") in favor of a doctrine of divine foreknowledge which is
inclusive except for the content of future free decisions. Concerning
prophecy, however, Rice allows for "exceptional" acts of divine intervention. But, one might ask, does this call for "exceptional" divine judgment
for those whose freedom has thus been violated? My sympathies, however,
are with Rice's view. Would it be too much to say that God has selective
foreknowledge? By insisting upon absolute divine foreknowledge do we
deny Him freedom of choice in His sphere while requiring it for ourselves
in ours?
Sanders makes a critical point with respect to the whole issue ok divine
determinism. He contends that our reading of the text of scripture is
governed by "control beliefs." These are preconceptions about God that
we begin with but which do not originate in scripture. This point is
critical and needs further development. It seems obvious that the theology
of Calvin, Luther, and others was controlled by beliefs about God that had
their origin in Greek philosophy. There is a fundamental correlation
between the idea of immutability and God as the unmoved mover. God is
the source of all motion, therefore He cannot move. Since He cannot
move, He cannot change. Hence with God there is no before or after, only
an eternal present. The problem with all of this is that it is not scriptural,
nor is it logically consistent (Rice-it denies God's omniscience), nor is it
acceptable, given our present knowledge of the universe. What is changeless about God is His character. God is love.
The book's strength is also its weakness. Having been written by a
number of authors, the insights, perspectives, and perceptions are enriching and broadening. But, quite naturally, it lacks an internal consistency.
The writers do not agree on all points. Moreover, in arguing their case
they are limited to one chapter. But, given their task, there is probably far
less risk in not saying enough than in saying too much.
The book is not, and does not intend to be, the last word on the
subject. But it is an extremely interesting and helpful source for those
engaged in the pursuit of knowledge on a very important issue for all
serious Christian scholars, especially at a time when the swing is away
from Calvinistic determinism.
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